Supreme Court holds that IP8 Does Not Violate Separate Vote Provision

In Meyer v. Bradbury, the Supreme Court (De Muniz, C.J.) reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that IP8, which would authorize the legislature, by a 3/4 vote of both houses, or the people, through the initiative process, to enact campaign finance regulations, does not violate the Article XVII, section 1 of the Oregon Constitution.  The court reasoned that the measure made more than one change to the constitution, but that the changes were "closely related" because the imposition of the supermajority requirement is a "procedural condition" governing the exercise the proposed authority to regulate campaign finance.

The court also responded to the California Supreme Court's criticism in Californians for an Open Primary v. McPherson, 134 P3d 299 (2006) (addressed in this blog here and here) by stating that its narrow reading of Oregon's separate vote provision was justified because of importance of the constitution as the state's paramount organic law:

In Oregon, however, the separate-vote requirement found in Article XVII, section 1, has a different application and is driven by a decidedly different rationale. As this court interpreted that provision in Armatta, the separate-vote requirement serves as a safeguard that is fundamental to the concept of a constitution. 327 Or at 276. In reaching that conclusion, this court did not perceive any reason to elaborate on why or how the concept of a constitution was important; instead, it noted only that the act of amending a state's organic law differs significantly from enacting or amending legislation. Id.

What the court only implied in that passage in Armatta, however, it has made explicit elsewhere. For example, this court observed in State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 542, 920 P2d 535 (1996):

"It is axiomatic that, among the various interests that the government of this state seeks to protect and promote, the interests represented by the state constitution are paramount to legislative ones."

(Emphasis added.) In our view, that hierarchy of law always must be acknowledged and respected. Consistently with that view, this court expressly has held that Oregon's separate-vote provision -- which applies to only constitutional amendments -- imposes a narrower requirement on the act of amending the constitution than does its counterpart, the single-subject rule, which applies equally to statutory as well as constitutional measures. Armatta, 327 Or at 276. To implement that narrower requirement, we do not search simply for a unifying thread to create a common theme, thought, or purpose from a melange of proposed constitutional changes. Instead, we inquire whether, if adopted, a proposal would make two or more changes to the constitution that are substantive and are not closely related. If so, the proposal violates the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1, because it would prevent voters from expressing their opinions as to each proposed change separately. Id. at 277. We turn now to that inquiry respecting IP 8.

Justice Durham dissented, concluding that he could not find a close relationship between the change the speech rights occasioned by the expansion of legislative authority to regulate campaign finance, and the accompanying change to the constitutional voting requirements governing the legislature.

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